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In particular, the extent to which states tend to promote, but not implement, HRE needs to be addressed. While in principle virtually everyone takes for granted the benefits of HRE, such endeavors can be potentially costly from the perspective of a state. Human rights education (or the construction of a human rights culture) is inherently revolutionary: if implemented effectively, it has the potential to generate social opposition, alongside rising demands for justice and accountability. States, however, can adopt a wide range of strategies for promoting a culture of human rights (for example, curricular reform, training, public awareness campaigns, and research) without actual implementation. They can fail to institutionalize HRE initiatives, withhold adequate funding, or not cooperate effectively with groups in civil society. In such cases, state-led HRE translates more into window dressing than into sustainable reform. Given these complex outcomes, the exact role of states in promoting HRE deserves close attention.
In addressing these gaps, I open the article by sketching broadly the relationship between states and HRE, including the puzzle of why states bother to promote HRE if it can backfire and generate mounting social demands. I then turn to delineating the contours of HRE and describing the principal crossregional challenges confronting HRE. Moving to an actual case study, I offer an overview of the South African Human Rights Commission's work on HRE. This commission is not only one of the most visible in the world, often a prominent member at international forums, but it is one of the most active in the HRE arena. Extrapolating from this case, the article concludes by considering critically the extent to which states promoting HRE can construct a culture of human rights.
States and Human Rights Education
According to its proponents, HRE should appeal to states because it promises to foster social tolerance, a democratic citizenry, and a climate wherein human rights abuses are less likely to occur. Embracing HRE, consequently, should be in the self-interest of most political leaders. International foundations and organizations have worked actively to promote this idea, providing funding and technical assistance to numerous states. Their aim is precisely to assure that the short-term costs of promoting HRE do not hinder its purported long-term gains.
Yet it remains puzzling why so many states in fact promote HRE. Why would states, most of which violate human rights norms to one degree or another, encourage dissent and run the risk of undermining their very legitimacy? When citizens are aware of their rights, are they not more likely to demand that those rights be protected? Indeed, that is what much democratic theory suggests (see, for example, Coleman, 1965; Dewey, 1916; Guttman, 1999; Kamens, 1988; Snauwaert, 1993) . Perhaps states promote HRE simply hypocritically, expecting to reap the international benefits of doing so. If this rationalist logic is correct, why bother? In a world of policy trade-offs, are the international rewards of promoting HRE likely to be that substantial? It is possible that a domestic societal approach is more relevant, with states providing HRE in response to pressures from "below."3 Yet this claim overlooks a basic insight of the human rights literature: states that violate human rights are highly unlikely to meet the demands of the societies they abuse.4 Alternatively, some states (at least post-conflict ones) may champion HRE in response to short-term "coercive socialization" (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990) , gradually aligning their interests with international norms. Even when this argument is compelling, however, post-conflict situations are relatively too few in number to explain why so many states promote HRE.
Beyond these approaches, a more sociological or constructivist logic (for example, Adler, 2002; Risse, 2002 ) might trace the global diffusion of HRE to the persuasive appeal of "education" itself." Education, after all, has been integral to the formation and consolidation of modern states. Political leaders have embraced national education because it promises, among other things, to be "an institutional agency for creating uniformities among the heterogeneous status and class groupings in society" (Ramirez and Rubinson, 1979: 79) . Thus, postcolonial states moved quickly in the 1950s to 1970s to create national education systems, which would forge social cohesion and foster nation-building, as well as train members of a modern labor force that would spur national economic development. It is no accident that national education systems have arisen historically in the shadows of industrialization (see Meyer et al., 1979 ).
Yet human rights education, at least hypothetically, can carry much higher risks for states than the other, more standard domains of education. As the following section details, HRE aspires partly to end and prevent the abuses committed, perpetuated, or tolerated by states. If successful, members of society may challenge the state openly, defying potential abusers or demanding punishment of violators and compensation for abuse. Once again, given its inherent risks, it is striking that such a diverse array of states around the world has ventured to promote HRE.
The sources of state adoption of HRE may instead be more comprehensive, complementing existing theoretical approaches. Given the global sweep of support for HRE and the fact that this phenomenon dates mostly to the 1990s, the role of transnational advocacy networks seems especially significant. These networks apply steady and diffuse pressures on states, persuading them to accept international human rights norms (Keck and Sikkink, 1997). According to this perspective, states promote HRE as a consequence of joint pressures from "above" and "below." In addition to domestic NGOs, networks of international organizations, advocacy groups, and foreign governments embrace HRE, leading individual states to do so as well. While the individual motives of states may vary in promoting HRE, the socializing role of transnational human rights networks should not be overlooked: these networks alter states' reputational calculations and define HRE as an appropriate state goal. And once transnational networks enhance the appeal of HRE, the seemingly innocuous effects of education (compared to human rights protection) may lead national leaders to overlook any longer-term risks. Proceeding from this theoretical context, the remainder of this section breaks descriptive ground by tracing HRE conceptually and examining broad cross-regional trends.
The Contours of Human Rights Education
Part of the appeal of HRE may be that it can be interpreted broadly. Certainly, the term "human rights education" evokes different images. It refers, on the one hand, to the human right to an education and, on the other, to being educated about human rights issues (see Hodgson, 1996; Lenhart and Savolainen, 2002) . To the extent that the former is partly encompassed within the broader right to general education, it is the latter that has dominated the work of most actors in the field. It is in this sense that the United Nations defines HRE as "training, dissemination and information efforts aimed at the building of a universal culture of human rights through the imparting of knowledge and skills and the moulding of attitudes" (UNGA, 1997: 5 Reflecting its fundamental nature, the assumption is that HRE can have numerous goals (Tibbitts, 2002) . These include human rights protection, personal empowerment, nation-building, democratic participation, and conflict resolution. Essentially, HRE seeks both to correct and to prevent human rights abuses. Human rights education purports to correct abuses mostly by making people aware of their rights and recourses. Additionally, state officials are trained to understand their own role in protecting human rights, including how to address complaints of abuse. Even when human rights protection fails, individuals whose rights have been violated still can be empowered through HRE. They may at least claim their rights, perhaps entering into networks with other victims or transnational advocacy groups (see Keck and Sikkink, 1997 ). In such instances, HRE serves to shatter the silence of victims.
Human rights education is also said to create strength in numbers, contributing to a sense of community and solidarity. A common assumption of international donors, for example, is that HRE can reinforce social cohesiveness and a sense of nationhood in post-conflict societies. Groups such as the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), UN Children's Fund, and UN Development Program have thus supported HRE in transitional polities such as Guatemala and East Timor.7 The dominant view is that human rights awareness will translate into greater democratization. Beyond the nation-state, HRE is also said to link people transnationally, arming them with a common set of commitments. Indeed, the broad-gauged nature of human rights makes it an appealing "umbrella" discourse, promising to encompass other issues on the global agenda. No systematic evidence exists yet that HRE has these effects, but policy advocates (from the European Union to the International Red Cross to the United Nations) argue that the potential benefits certainly are worth the effort (for example, see UNHCHR, 2003).
More specifically, HRE tends to have three types of target audience: (1) the public-at-large; (2) schools and educational institutions; and (3) professional groups, both governmental and nongovernmental.
Contrary to popular images, the target of HRE is more than just children. Public education campaigns, including use of the popular media, can be harnessed to raise public awareness and diffuse international human rights norms. Still more directly, human rights standards and issues can be incorporated explicitly into school curricula. Likewise, HRE entails training professional groups, both inside and outside the state apparatus. Within the state, HRE can consist of military and police training (Das and Verma, 2002) activities, as well as training of the judiciary. Outside the state, targets of specialized training include members of local NGOs, women's groups, the media, and teachers. More broadly, states promote HRE by encouraging research and study of human rights issues. These activities and target groups are summarized in Table 1 . International groups, including the UN and international NGOs, also help to facilitate capacity building and networking among local groups.
To turn international standards into national practice, the United Nations has devised a set of minimum guidelines for all states to follow. Integral to these guidelines is the notion of devising a "national plan of action," in which the state can detail exactly how it intends to implement HRE (United Nations, 1997). More specifically, a national committee, drawn along pluralistic and representative lines, is to be charged with drafting the national plan. This plan should assess institutional resources, identify those groups most in need of HRE, determine how HRE matches broader national goals and obstacles, including development, and outline a comprehensive strategy of national HRE, which sets priorities and proposes any required legislative changes. In short, states are to tailor international standards to match local needs and resources. While virtually no state developed a 
Cross-Regional Trends
The global proliferation of HRE is difficult to gauge, but a UN survey of progress conducted in the Decade for HRE offers some clues.8 This survey was based on information collected directly from governments, so a self-reporting bias clearly exists. Nonetheless, the survey still shows variation among countries, and it suggests whether a country is incorporating HRE into its national laws and policies. Despite the crudeness of the measure, a discernible cross-regional trend is apparent: HRE is strongest among states in Europe and the Americas, followed by the Middle East and North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Asia-Pacific region. It should be noted, moreover, that this regional breakdown corresponds closely to the regional distribution of national (governmental) human rights commissions, one of the central tasks of which is precisely to promote HRE.9 The similarity of these rankings therefore makes it more likely that the regional distribution of state-led HRE is accurate (see Figure 1 ). In the remainder of this section, I sketch other broad cross-regional trends, based on a UN study of state and non-state actors involved in HRE (UNGA, 2000).
Human rights education in Africa has revolved around curricular initiatives, especially those incorporating human rights concepts into local schools. In contrast, HRE for professional groups has been relatively rare. Most professional human rights training tends to be conducted by NGOs, such as those affiliated with the Inter-African Union for Human Rights. The principal challenge facing this region appears to be one of securing technical assistance in the short term and sustained funding in the long term, as well as forging strong regional linkages among actors involved in HRE. Human rights education also confronts systemic challenges in the region, such as illiteracy, poverty, and political instability. When states in Africa do participate in HRE, much of this activity is taken under the auspices of national human rights commissions (for example, South Africa's Human Rights Commission), which in the late 1990s grew more than sixfold in the region, from six in 1996 to 38 in 1999 (see Human Rights Watch, 2001; also Addo, 2000; Kiwanuka, 1987; Martin, 1987) .
As in Africa, most HRE in the Americas (Cuellar, 2000; IIDH, 2000; Stone, 2002) has focused on curricular reform, including textbook revisions, although states have remained largely uninvolved in these initiatives. In fact, within the state, HRE across the region tends to fall under the purview of ministries of education rather than human rights agencies per se. Formal laws and policies, moreover, have remained mostly unchanged, with one exception: countries that have undergone peace processes (that is, El Salvador and Guatemala) have incorporated HRE somewhat into their domestic laws and institutions. While the scope of activities taken under the rubric of HRE is vast in the Americas, little effort has been made to institutionalize these practices so that they are sustainable. As in Africa, international NGOs and regional organizations (from the US-based Human Rights Education Associates to the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights) have stepped in to fill the void left by the state and are conducting many of these activities. Interested parties highlight repeatedly the importance of forging partnerships between states and NGOs, as well as the need for broad-gauged public awareness campaigns using media outlets. All told, the relative weakness of HRE is attributed to a lack of financial resources and technical assistance. A few overwhelming trends are common across most regions of the world (see Table 2 ). First, effective HRE requires strong cooperation between states and NGOs. Such cooperation would capitalize on the strengths of each actor, while infusing HRE initiatives with greater legitimacy. Second, regional networking among all groups engaged in HRE would be beneficial (see Cardenas, 2003b ). The informational exchange and learning associated with networking could, at a minimum, help individual countries reduce the costs of promoting HRE. Third, states have almost uniformly failed to incorporate HRE into domestic laws and policies, although for HRE to be sustainable in the long run, it may have to be institutionalized at the national level. Fourth, HRE requires a commitment of funding and technical assistance, resources that all regions lack or have been unwilling to provide. Absent these concrete commitments, it is unlikely that HRE programs and policies can be effective. Fifth, tools designed for assessing the impact of HRE are desperately needed. Such tools could include systematic surveys, administered at regular intervals, to determine the relative success of HRE initiatives in specific countries. While impact assessment tools are certainly important for all human rights initiatives, they may be even more fundamental in an emerging and broadly defined field like HRE.
These trends are significant in several ways. On the one hand, the similarities 
South Africa: An Illustrative Case The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) was established in 1995, following the 1994 Human Rights Commission Act signed by President Nelson
Mandela; unlike the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which is no longer operational, it is a permanent state institution. As stated in paragraph 184, Chapter 9 of South Africa's constitution (1996), SAHRC has three major functions: to "(a) promote respect for human rights and a culture of human rights; (b) promote the protection, development, and attainment of human rights; and (c) monitor and assess the observance of human rights in the republic." Although the SAHRC's authority and its organizational attention to HRE derive from the national constitution and the country's Bill of Rights, the latter documents draw on both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights while taking into account South Africa's particular needs (SAHRC, 1997). The state's interest in promoting HRE is also framed in terms of longer-term gains, including conflict resolution and even lower crime rates (SAHRC, 1999a: 35).
In addition to having HRE as a central mandate, the SAHRC is one of the leading national human rights institutions in the world and in Africa. Since its inception, it has played a major role globally, participating visibly and actively in international coordinating bodies. In Africa, it is arguably "one of the best-funded and most active human rights commissions" (Human Rights Watch, 2001). That said, less than one-tenth of the SAHRC's budget is devoted to HRE."' Even if this figure is more than most states commit to HRE, it remains disproportionate to the apparent centrality of HRE in the commission's mandate.
In comparative terms, however, the broad scope of HRE activities pursued by the SAHRC sets this commission apart from similar institutions. It has promoted HRE on the curricular front and in professional training, as well as in informal venues. Curricular initiatives have included assisting provincial education departments, lobbying the national education department, producing documents and materials that can be disseminated to teachers, as well as facilitating teacher training (see Kruss, 2001 ). The SAHRC also sponsors school activities during "Human Rights Week" and on "Human Rights Day," as well as organizing poster and other competitions for young people around the theme of racism (SAHRC, 2005). Additionally, SAHRC activities in the field of HRE emphasize the professional training of police, healthcare workers, and other target groups. Such training occurs mostly via national and provincial workshops or seminars. Like any actor involved in HRE, SAHRC has had to confront the challenge of "normative transfer," or tailoring international human rights norms to match local standards and needs (Lohrenscheit, 2002: 181) . This requires, for example, confronting practical imperatives such as translating documents into local languages and disseminating human rights norms via local interlocutors who have access to and legitimacy among distinct communities. Indeed, this is one of the rationales for training community leaders, or "training the trainers," who can transfer knowledge about human rights to a mass audience. Vulnerable groups specifically targeted for HRE include community organizations, trade unions, women's and rural groups, and those who are HIV-positive.
As part of its HRE initiatives, the SAHRC also diffuses human rights norms through more informal means, including the use of media outlets. Accordingly, the SAHRC takes out radio advertisements, sometimes with the assistance of international funders (for example, the US Agency for International Development). Local newspapers occasionally carry advertisements on particular themes, such as children's rights or domestic violence. Much more frequently, however, workshops and conferences constitute the commission's informal outreach work. In addition to creating the center, the SAHRC has taken two further steps, which it has linked explicitly to UN-led activities surrounding the decade. First, it has sought to coordinate the work of all domestic actors engaged with HRE, both inside and outside of the state. According to the SAHRC, "There is no national institution dedicated to consistent, systematic and focused human rights education in South Africa. There are centers and institutes based at universities, providing seminars, courses and conferences on human rights but no dedicated programme of human rights education such as the one we envisage" (SAHRC, 1999a: 36). Beyond national coordination, the commission has taken a leading role in coordinating the HRE efforts of other national human rights institutions in the region. To this end, the SAHRC has hosted meetings, shared know-how, and disseminated relevant materials. Members of other national, human rights institutions in Africa are also brought to the Human Rights Education and Training Center, in some cases through privately funded scholarships. More than educating people about human rights, the SAHRC has sought to protect "the right to an education." In part, this has been a response to the large number of complaints it has received relating to rights abuses committed in educational settings, including racism or violence in schools. These complaints clearly reflect the challenge in post-apartheid South Africa of complying with the constitutional guarantee to provide all members of society with access to a free education, especially given the skewed legacy of past abuses. The SAHRC has responded to this need mostly by conducting investigations and publishing reports. To its credit, the commission has reacted to a pattern of individual complaints regarding equality in education by using its authority to undertake a broad, systemic investigation of the issue. It has prepared reports ranging from initiation practices at educational institutions to racism and discrimination in education (for example, SAHRC, 1999b, 2001).
What can be learned from the SAHRC's involvement in HRE? Answering this question requires assessing the effectiveness or influence of this institution, clearly a difficult task (see more broadly, Cingranelli and Richards, 2001). Still, a few conclusions can be drawn tentatively from the commission's strengths and weaknesses in promoting HRE. On a positive front, the SAHRC has demonstrated how the diffusion of human rights in national settings requires tailoring strategies to meet local needs and conditions. Indeed, the SAHRC has taken a less legalistic stance on HRE than is typical internationally.11 The commission's work in the areas described above appears fruitful, although it is too soon to assess a pattern of influence. Further, the SAHRC has used its extensive powers (for example, issuing subpoenas to state officials and conducting public hearings) to investigate systemic state violations of human rights norms. Indeed, some of the reports of these investigations have received public, high-profile attention. Like human rights organizations in general, the SAHRC has helped to place HRE on the state's agenda and to insert specific human rights standards into the domestic context. This normative power should not be overlooked.
More critically, the SAHRC has been subject to several general critiques that may affect its capacity to promote HRE effectively. (With noted exceptions (for example, Baxi, 1996) HRE itself is not typically targeted, perhaps because skeptics do not consider it significant enough to debate its merits.) First, as an actor precariously situated between the state and society, the SAHRC has often been perceived as siding with the state, or at least as not pushing the state sufficiently to fulfill its commitments. This has manifested itself in the SAHRC's failure to demand that state agents (whether parliamentarians or local police) enforce its recommendations."2 Coincidentally, but not surprisingly, 90 percent of the commission's overall funding is from the state.
Second, the SAHRC has been chastised for being insufficiently accessible to many segments of the population, including areas of the country that are remote from the commission's few provincial offices. Lastly, any human rights institution must develop reliable tools to assess systematically the impact of its work, especially in the area of HRE, where the greatest rewards may be cumulative. This challenge confronts diverse states and human rights commissions around the world, as discussed above. In the case of South Africa, the creation of the training center is a step in the right direction, but stronger links between the SAHRC and universities, NGOs, and international governmental organizations will need to be forged before more reliable indicators of institutional effectiveness can be devised.
After entering its second seven-year term in 2002, the SAHRC showed signs of defining HRE broadly as a process of socialization. This was reflected in a general shift from civil and political rights to greater attention to economic and social rights. While this change may have been the result of new leadership more than organizational learning, in terms of HRE, it has led to an emphasis on "educating about human rights," not just "the human right to education" (Matlou, 2002) . Before HRE transforms the cultural milieu (Majodine, 2002; Sarkin, 1998) , however, the SAHRC will need to clarify its exact role vis-a-vis the state and society at large -remaining independent from the state, but accessible to all South Africans.
Conclusion
Human rights education is predicated on the central premise that a culture of human rights can be constructed.'4 This article calls into question the extent to which states have in fact contributed to building such a culture. While state interests in promoting HRE may vary widely, reflecting both the benefits of jumping on the HRE bandwagon and the global normative appeal of this broad concept, the empirical record suggests that actual implementation has been weak. In general, states are not institutionalizing HRE fully, funding it adequately, or cooperating sufficiently with non-state actors. This is evident cross-regionally, among highly diverse states, and even states such as South Africa that have been particularly active in the HRE arena. Yet without sufficient political, economic, and social capital, any attempts to construct a human rights culture are likely to founder. Supporters of HRE (whether international organizations, non-state groups, or funding agencies) now need to call on states explicitly to bridge the gap between promoting and implementing HRE.
The South African case highlights these dynamics, revealing the possibilities States of all stripes have been able to embrace HRE to some degree, given the concept's ambiguous nature and apparent innocuousness. In a global climate in which HRE has become part of the modern state's human rights repertoire, doing so promises to enhance a state's international image. Yet despite the half-hearted measures that most states have taken during the UN decade, in the end the most fundamental effect of HRE may be its capacity to change social expectations, generating vital debate and public contestation. This is a substantial normative achievement that may be necessary, if insufficient, for producing concrete human rights reform. The colossal challenge will be to change the expectations of those who hold power (current and future generations) so that HRE does more than simply widen the gap between human rights demands and state practice. 
